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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Jingyun Yang
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Finance
June 2018
Title: Cross-trading and Liquidity Management: Evidence from Municipal Bond Funds
The high flow-performance sensitivity in open-end municipal bond funds motivates
fund managers to actively manage funding liquidity risk and reduce the costs of flow-
driven transactions. Funds with volatile past flows build up liquidity buffers by holding
more cash and liquid municipal bonds in their portfolios. Funds rely on cash and liquid
securities in flow management. Unconventional liquidity management tools, such as cross-
trading between funds in the same family, are used by municipal bond funds in extreme
situations. Fund families coordinate cross-trades between open- and low-value closed-end
funds only when open-end funds are in distress.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Liquidity management is important for open-end funds due to their liquidity transfer
roles. Open-end funds provide liquidity to their investors by allowing investors to redeem
shares at the net asset value on a daily basis. However, liquidity transformation hurts
fund performance for several reasons. First, funds have to liquidate their holdings in a
short period upon investor redemption requests. These forced liquidations may happen
at dislocated prices during fire sale events (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) and Coval and Stafford (2007)) and impose large, negative externalities
on the rest of investors who stay with the funds (Johnson (2004)). Second, funds have
to build liquidity buffers in order to avoid costly fire sales. Liquidity buffers such as cash
holdings reduce fund performance because high liquidity is associated with low expected
returns.
The literature on mutual fund liquidity management is relatively small but grow-
ing fast in recent years. Previous studies look at mutual fund liquidity management us-
ing cash and cash equivalents (Yan (2006), Fulkerson and Riley (2016) and Chernenko
and Sunderam (2016)) and derivatives such as futures and credit default swaps (Koski
and Pontiff (1999), Frino, Lepone and Wong (2009) and Jiang and Zhu (2015)). The re-
cent literature studies cash and liquidity management in corporate bond funds (Jiang, Li
and Wang (2016)). The literature also provides evidence on other liquidity management
channels. Agarwal and Zhao (2016) study family-level liquidity management using inter-
fund lending programs. Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) find economies of scale in cash
holdings at the family-level and provide evidence on interfund lending programs. In this
paper, I contribute to the literature by investigating the liquidity management mecha-
nisms of open-end municipal bond funds and the impact of liquidity management on fund
performance. In additional to examining the use of cash and liquid securities in liquid-
ity management, I find evidence on an alternative liquidity management channel, cross-
1
trading, which is only used in extreme situations. Specifically, I find that fund families
use closed-end funds to provide liquidity to distressed open-end funds by coordinating
cross-trades through the family internal market.
Liquidity management is particularly important for municipal bond funds. Flow-
driven transactions are very costly in the municipal bond market because of the low mar-
ket liquidity. Funds with insufficient cash and liquid holdings suffer from large losses due
to investor flow shocks. However, liquidity buffers such as cash holdings decrease funds’
future performance. Moreover, recent literature finds that fund runs and fire sales are
more likely to happen if the mutual funds invest in illiquid assets. Zeng (2017) builds
a theoretical model and shows that mutual funds with illiquid holdings may experience
fund runs even with optimal liquidity management. In an illiquid market, mutual funds
that experienced outflows optimally re-build cash buffers by liquidating their holdings,
but these sales of illiquid assets lead to poor future performance. Therefore, rational in-
vestors seeking first-mover advantage redeem their shares, leading to fund runs. This
theoretical model is consistent with recent empirical evidence on the mutual fund flow-
performance relationship. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2010) find that outflows of equity
funds are more sensitive to bad past performance when the funds hold illiquid assets.
Goldstein, Jiang and Ng (2017) find that the flow-performance relationship is concave for
corporate bond funds, indicating that investor outflows are highly sensitive to poor past
performance. Since the municipal bond market has low market liquidity, I expect that
investors have incentives to seek first-mover advantage by withdrawing their assets from
open-end municipal bond funds. Such redemption requests force municipal bond funds to
liquidate their illiquid holdings, leading to poor performance in the future.
I begin with testing the flow-performance relationship in open-end municipal bond
funds. I find evidence that municipal bond fund flows are highly sensitive to past perfor-
mance, especially poor past performance. In the region of positive returns, an 1% increase
in funds’ past performance can attract 0.27% investor inflows per month. In the region
of negative returns, an 1% decrease in funds’ past performance can cause 0.44% investor
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outflows. The high flow-performance sensitivity, together with the low liquidity of the
municipal bond market, imposes large liquidity risk on municipal bond funds. Therefore,
municipal bond funds have strong incentive to manage liquidity risk.
Next, I investigate how municipal bond funds use conventional tools, namely cash
and liquid securities, to manage liquidity risk. Cash is one of the most liquid assets in the
financial market and the most widely used liquidity management tool in asset manage-
ment. If open-end funds have high funding liquidity risk, fund managers will build cash
buffers to prepare for unexpected investor flows. Fund managers can also hold liquid fi-
nancial securities in their portfolios so that they can earn positive expected returns while
having low transaction costs at liquidity-driven trading. I collect data on municipal bond
funds’ quarterly holdings from Morningstar and find that the average open-end municipal
bond fund invests 1.52% net assets in cash and cash equivalents and 98.27% net assets
in municipal bonds. I also use the quarterly holding data from CRSP. Consistent with
the results from Morningstar, CRSP also reports that open-end municipal bond funds
have low cash holdings. Open-end municipal bond funds on average hold 2.23% cash and
97.74% municipal bonds. Funds with higher funding liquidity risk, as proxied by past
flow volatility, hold more cash and more liquid municipal bonds. When open-end funds’
monthly flow volatility increases by 1%, the funds will hold additional 0.22% net assets in
cash. When open-end funds’ flow volatility increases by 1%, the average 12-month trad-
ing volume of their municipal bond holdings increases by 1.52 million and the average
12-month bid-ask spread decreases by 2.3 basis points. Consistent with municipal bond
funds using cash and liquid securities to accommodate investor flows, their cash position
change and portfolio liquidity change are positively associated with the concurrent flows.
I also find that open-end funds in large families hold less cash, suggesting economics of
scale in cash management at fund family level.
The low cash holdings in municipal bond funds seem to be surprising. Intuitively,
municipal bond funds should hold more cash than equity and corporate bond funds be-
cause the municipal bond market is less liquid than the equity and corporate bond mar-
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kets. However, previous literature finds that past flow volatility, rather than the market
liquidity, is the key determinant of cash holdings. For example, the recent SEC mutual
fund liquidity white paper (Hanouna et al. (2015)) finds that U.S. equity funds have aver-
age cash holdings of 3.1% and monthly flow volatility of 5.8%, U.S. bond funds have cash
holdings about 2.5%-2.9% and monthly flow volatility around 4.9%-6.6%, and U.S. mu-
nicipal bond funds have cash holdings of 1.9% and monthly flow volatility around 2.7%.1
Consistent with the previous literature, I also find that open-end municipal bond funds
have low cash holdings around 1.52% - 2.23% and low average flow volatility of 1.47%. I
conclude that the average open-end municipal bond funds do not hold excessive cash be-
cause they have less volatile flows than equity and corporate bond funds.
Even though open-end municipal bond funds do not have volatile flows, liquidity
management is still a major task of fund managers because of the high transaction costs
in municipal bond market. The average transaction costs (bid-ask spread) of municipal
bond fund portfolios in my sample are 66.5 basis points. If open-end fund managers liq-
uidate their portfolios proportionally to meet investor redemption requests, this is the
transaction costs they pay. However, I find that a fund portfolio’s average bid-ask spread
only changes by 27 basis points following flow shocks, suggesting that fund managers use
liquid municipal bonds in their portfolios to accommodate fund flows. I find similar re-
sults using trading volume, Amihud liquidity and zero-trading as the liquidity measure.
In addition, open-end municipal bond funds can experience large flows in extreme
situations. The top and bottom 5th percentiles of quarterly flows are 10.74% and -7.77%.
Given the illiquid nature of the municipal bond market, traditional liquidity management
tools are unlikely to be sufficient to absorb extreme flow shocks. Compared to other types
of open-end funds, municipal bond funds are more likely to explore alternative liquidity
management tools in extreme situations. Specifically, I focus on cross-trading as an un-
conventional liquidity management channel. In case of large investor redemptions, dis-
1Please find summary statistics of cash holding and flow volatility in previous literature in Appendix
Table B1 and B2.
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tressed open-end funds are forced to liquidate their assets at dislocated prices. However,
if distressed open-end funds cross-trade with affiliated funds through the family internal
market2, they may be able to avoid costly fire sales.
Cross-trading has been used as a liquidity management tool in the asset manage-
ment industry, especially at extreme circumstances. For example, Pimco sold about $18
billion of Pimco Total Return’s assets to other Pimco funds in order to meet more than
$100 billion of redemptions that followed Bill Gross’s surprise exit in September 20143.
Family-level cross-trading can be useful in liquidity management for open-end funds with
illiquid assets for several reasons. First, funds can avoid expensive transaction costs if
they cross-trade in the family internal market. It is well known that the municipal bond
market is one of the most illiquid financial market in the U.S.. Chalmers, Liu and Wang
(2017) shows that the average round-trip dealer’s markup (transaction costs) is around
200 basis points or even higher for transactions worth less than $25k4. There is also anec-
dotal evidence that investment advisors avoid transaction costs through cross-trading.
For example, in an investigation against Western Asset Management, the SEC finds that
”by avoiding exposing the cross-traded securities to the market, Western saved market
costs totaling approximately $12.4 million”5. Second, municipal bond funds can avoid
the negative price impact of flow-driven transactions by cross-trading in family internal
market. During fire sales of illiquid assets, asset prices could drop significantly and may
2Rule 17a-7 under the 1940 Act allows cross-trading in the family internal market can take place if:
1) cross-trading funds are affiliated solely by reason of having a common investment adviser; 2) the trans-
action price should be the independent current market prices, and the “current market price” for certain
securities (such as municipal securities) is calculated by averaging the highest and lowest current indepen-
dent bid and offer price; 3) the transaction is consistent with the investment policy of each participating
fund; 4) no brokerage commission, fee (except for customary transfer fees), or other remuneration is paid
in connection with the transaction; 5) the transaction is approved by the fund’s board of director. More
details on cross-trading regulations can be found in the two SEC staff interpretive letters: United Munici-
pal Bond Fund (July 30, 1992) and Federated Municipal Funds (Nov. 20, 2006).
3See Bloomberg artical Pimco May Have Averted Fire Sale After Gross’s Exit and Pimco Total Re-
turn’s annual shareholder reports for more details on the fund’s in-house clearance sale.
4See Figure 1 in Chalmers, Liu and Wang (2017) for more details on municipal bond transaction costs.
5See Western Asset Management Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 30893 (Jan. 27, 2014) for
details on Western Asset Management cross-trading violations.
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take weeks or even months to reverse. If distressed open-end funds cross-trade with peer
funds, they can avoid the abnormal negative returns during fire sales.
I expect that cross-trading is concentrated in fund families that manage both open-
and closed-end funds because closed-end funds are immune to investors flows and there-
fore are good candidates for providing liquidity. When fund families coordinate cross-
trades, they can transfer performance from closed- to open-end funds by setting the trans-
action prices beneficial to open-end funds. This would improve the performance of dis-
tressed open-end funds and reduce fund outflows. Meanwhile, the closed-end funds do not
suffer outflows after poor performance. The net effect will be an increase in fund family
value. I do not expect fund families to coordinate cross-trades between open-end funds
because such cross-trades tend to be zero-sum games. If one open-end fund benefits from
cross-trading, the other will bear losses and therefore experience subsequent outflows.
Outflows from poor-performing funds and inflows to good-performing funds offset each
other and the fund family value remains the same.
To investigate whether open-end funds use family-coordinated cross-trading in liq-
uidity management, I follow the cross-subsidization literature to use offsetting holding
changes between funds to estimate cross-trading and use matched sample methodology to
test whether family-level liquidity management exists through cross-trading. First, I test
whether open-end funds cross-trade with affiliated closed-end funds and whether these
cross-trades are associated with flows of open-end funds. I find evidence that fund fam-
ilies only coordinate cross-trades when open-end funds experience extreme outflows. I
also find evidence that cross-trading concentrates in one direction: distressed open-end
funds cross-sell to affiliated closed-end funds. I use different matching methods and find
consistent evidence of cross-trading as an alternative liquidity management tool for dis-
tressed open-end funds. I also use hand-collected information on investment advisors’
cross-trading policy from Form ADV and find that the relationship between cross-trading
and open-end fund flows only exists when the fund families allow cross-trading between
two member funds.
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Second, I study how cross-trading affects open-end fund performance. In the OLS
regression, I find that cross-trading is negatively associated with open-end fund perfor-
mance. This could be due to endogeneity since distressed open-end funds with poor per-
formance and large outflows are more likely to engage in cross-trading. To address the
endogeneity, I use investment advisors’ cross-trading policy collected from Form ADV as
the instrumental variable and find that cross-trading is no longer associated with poor
open-end fund performance.
Finally, I study whether cross-trading is associated with fund investment styles
and characteristics. I find that cross-trading happens mostly between open- and closed-
end funds with the same investment style and that national funds cross-trade more than
single-state funds. This strong style effect is consistent with the SEC regulation that
cross-trading must be consistent with the investment policy of each participating fund.
I also explore whether cross-trading is related to certain open- and closed-end fund char-
acteristics, such as expense ratio, fund age and fund size. For open-end funds, I find no
significant relationship between cross-trading and fund characteristics. The strong asso-
ciation between cross-trading and open-end fund flow, together with the lack of associa-
tion between cross-trading and open-end fund characteristics, suggests that fund families
mainly use cross-trading as a liquidity management channel. In contrast, I find evidence
that fund families prefer to use low-value closed-end funds, such as mature funds and low-
fee funds, to provide liquidity to peer open-end funds. These results are consistent with
family cross-subsidization (Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006)) and family-value maximiza-
tion.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, the paper contributes to the lit-
erature of cash and liquidity management. Consistent with prior research on other types
of funds, I find that municipal bond funds build liquidity buffers to reduce the impact of
potential fire sales. I find evidence that municipal bond funds use cash and liquid mu-
nicipal bonds to meet investor redemptions to avoid high transaction costs in the illiquid
municipal bond market.
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Second, the paper provides new insight into on family-level liquidity management
tools. Most previous studies focus on liquidity management using cash and derivatives.
Recent studies provide evidence of family-level liquidity management. Agarwal and Zhao
(2016) looks at interfund lending programs. Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) find economies
of scale in liquidity management at the fund family level and explore liquidity manage-
ment using lines of credit and interfund lending within the fund family. I also find economies
of scale in cash holding at the fund family level and provide evidence that fund families
coordinate cross-trades between open- and closed-end funds to support distressed open-
end funds.
Last, it adds to the literature of flow-performance sensitivity. The literature finds
strong evidence of a convex flow-performance relationship in equity mutual funds. For
example, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and
Tufano (1997) find that investors inflows are very sensitive to good past performance,
while outflows are not sensitive to poor past performance. Recent studies, such as Gold-
stein, Jiang and Ng (2017), examine the flow-performance relationship in corporate bond
funds and find a concave relationship. This paper provides evidence on the concave flow-
performance relationship in municipal bond mutual funds.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the sample data and sum-
mary statistics. Section 3 tests the flow-performance relationship in municipal bond funds.
Section 4 studies liquidity management using cash and liquid municipal bonds. Section 5
provides evidence of cross-trading as an unconventional liquidity management tool. Sec-
tion 6 shows robustness tests of cash management and cross-trading in liquidity manage-
ment. Section 7 summarizes the main findings of this paper.
8
CHAPTER II
DATA AND SAMPLE
I obtain fund returns, characteristics and quarterly portfolios from Morningstar database.
The open-end fund sample includes all actively-managed U.S. open-end municipal bond
funds from January 2002 to June 2016. I exclude index funds and fund of funds. Open-
end funds are required to have at least 5 million in net asset value and 1 year in age to
be included in the sample. The closed-end funds sample period is from January 2002 to
March 2016. I do not apply size or age sample filter to closed-end funds because I expect
that closed-end fund characteristics are associated with cross-trading between open- and
closed-end funds6.
2.1 Fund Performance and Characteristics
Morningstar Direct reports returns and characteristics for each share class of U.S. munic-
ipal bond funds. I use share class data to calculate fund-level returns and characteristics.
NAVt is a fund’s total net asset value across all share classes at the end of quarter t. Age
is the number of years since the inception of a fund’s oldest share class. Expense is the
NAV-weighted average annual expense ratio across all share classes of a fund. Turnover
is the weighted average annual turnover ratio. Institutional is the NAV of a fund’s insti-
tutional share class as a percentage of the fund’s NAV.
An open-end fund’s FamilyNAV is the total net asset value of all open-end funds
the family. An open-end fund’s FamilyNAVCEF is the total net asset value of all closed-
end funds in the family and 0 if the fund family does not manage closed-end fund. I ob-
tain the snapshot of municipal bond funds’ family names, investment advisors and sub-
advisors at the end of June 2016 from Morningstar Direct and hand-collect historical
information about municipal bond funds’ families from SEC Edgar filings in the follow-
6In untabulated robustness tests, I get statistically similar results after requiring closed-end funds to
be at least 5 million in size and 1 year in age.
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ing steps. First, I search a fund’s earliest and latest available NSAR and N-CSR forms
between 2002 and 2016 to identify its family names at the beginning and the end of the
sample period. Second, I compare these two fund family names. If the family names are
the same, I assume that the fund belongs to the same family during the sample period.
If the two family names are different, I search the fund’s N-CSR forms between 2002
and 2016 for discussion of fund family changes. A fund is assumed to change families
during the sample period if its investment company has M&As or asset sale events. A
fund is assumed to remain in the same family if the difference in reported family names
is because of renaming of the investment company and its subsidiaries7 Lastly, I per-
form a web search to verify the historical fund family information. To better illustrate
how FamilyNAV is calculated, I use Invesco California Tax-Free Income Fund as an
example. Morningstar Direct shows the fund family name as Invesco at the end of June
2016. However, a search in the SEC filings shows that it was previously owned by Mor-
gan Stanley and known as Morgan Stanley California Tax-Free Income Fund. The fund
name and family name changed when Invesco acquired Morgan Stanley’s retail asset man-
agement business on June 1, 2010. Since the web search results confirm the asset sale
between Invesco and Morgan Stanley in 2010, I conclude that this fund belongs to Mor-
gan Stanley before June 2010 and Invesco after June 20108. Before June 2016, the fund’s
FamilyNAV is the total NAV of all open-end funds managed by Morgan Stanley and its
subsidiary, Van Kampen Investments. After June 2016, its FamilyNAV is the total NAV
of all open-end funds managed by Invesco.
A fund’s quarterly Flow9 is defined as: Flowt =
NAVt −NAVt−1 ×Rt
NAVt−1
, where Rt is
7For example, DWS Investments was renamed Deutsche funds on Au-
gust 11, 2014. An example of Deutsche funds’ N-CSR can be found at:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/203142/000008805315000018/ar103114stmb.htm.
8Invesco California Tax-Free Income Fund semiannual shareholders report in 2010 can be found at:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1112996/000095012310083678/h74591nvcsrs.htm. The fund
was formerly know as Morgan Stanley California Tax-Free Income Fund. Its 2009 annual shareholders
report can be found at: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/745992/000110465910012937/a10-
2259 1ncsr.htm.
9Fund flows are truncated at the top and bottom 1%.
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the fund’s quarterly gross return. FlowV ol12 (FlowV ol24) is the standard deviation of a
fund’s monthly flows in the past 12 (24) months.
A fund’s past 1-year performance (PastPerf) is the intercept from a regression of
net excess returns on excess stock market and municipal bond market returns in the past
12 months. I use CRSP value-weighted market index as proxy for stock market and the
Vanguard total bond market index fund as proxy for bond market. A fund’s quarterly
return (Ret) is the weighted average NAV-return of all share classes. A fund’s quarterly
alpha (α) is the quarterly cumulative abnormal return, estimated from a regression of the
fund’s monthly net excess returns on excess stock market and bond market returns. I use
the past 24 months as estimation window, CRSP value-weighted market index return as
the stock market return and Vanguard total bond market index fund return as the bond
market return. 10 RetV ol12 is the standard deviation of a fund’s monthly net returns in
the past 12 months.
2.2 Measure of Liquidity
I use cash holdings and the average liquidity of the municipal bonds held by an open-end
fund to measure the liquidity of the fund.
2.2.1 Cash Holding
I combine portfolio weights from Morningstar mutual fund quarterly holdings and Morn-
ingstar Direct to calculate cash position, Cash, for open-end municipal bond funds. I
obtain the portfolio weights in cash and cash equivalents from Morningstar quarterly
holdings. A holding is identified as cash and cash equivalents if it has type code as one of
the following: C(cash), CD(CD or time deposit), CP(commercial paper), CR(repurchase
agreement), FM(money market fund), CH/CL/CO/CQ/CS/CU/CV/CX(currency and
10Fund performance are truncated at the top and bottom 1%.
11
currency based derivative), and OO/OS/OT(cash derivative offsets)11. When cash posi-
tions are missing in Morningstar quarterly holdings, I obtain the portfolio weights in cash
and cash equivalents, including cash, CDs, T-bills, commercial paper, money market fund
and repurchase agreement, from Morningstar Direct. I use Morningstar quarterly hold-
ings to calculate the portfolio weights in municipal bonds for open-end funds. Cash and
municipal bond positions are truncated at the top and bottom 1%.
One drawback of using cash holdings from Morningstar is that almost half observa-
tions in the sample have missing value in cash holdings. Therefore, I also obtain open-end
municipal bond funds’ cash holdings, Cashcrsp, and municipal bond holdings, Municrsp
from CRSP database. Cash holdings in CRSP database can be matched with 82.7% of
fund-quarter observations in the sample. However, CRSP database has drawbacks as well.
First, CRSP only provides open-end funds’ municipal bond holdings after 2008. Second,
Schwarz and Potter (2016) find that CRSP contains inaccurate position information prior
to 2008. I use cash positions from Morningstar to conduct the liquidity management tests
and use cash positions from CRSP as the robustness check.
2.2.2 Portfolio Liquidity
I also use the liquidity of municipal bonds held by a fund to measure the fund’s liquidity:
PortLiquidityt =
Nt∑
b=1
wb,tLiquidityb,t,
where Liquidityb,t is the liquidity measure for each municipal bond b held by the fund in
quarter t, Nt is the total number of municipal bonds held by the fund in quarter t, and
wb,t is the fund’s portfolio weight for bond b at quarter t.
I use trading volume, bid-ask spread, Amihud liquidity and zero-trade to measure
a municipal bond’s liquidity. All liquidity variables for municipal bonds are computed us-
11I randomly pick 15 open-end municipal bond funds and compare the quarterly cash holdings in
Morningstar to the semi-annual holdings in Form N-CSR. The cash positions in Morningstar and Form
N-CSR are mostly consistent.
12
ing Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) municipal bond trading database,
which reports the price, size, and time for each municipal bond transaction in the over-
the-counter market. The database also reports each municipal bond transaction type
as dealer-purchase, dealer-sell, or inter-dealer. I obtain municipal bond transaction data
from January 2001 to June 2016.
The first measure is round-trip trading volume. A municipal bond’s monthly trad-
ing volume is the total size (par value in millions) of all dealer-purchase transactions in
a month. I use a municipal bond’s trading volume in the past 3 months and 12 months
to measure the bond’s liquidity. AvgV olume3 and AvgV olume12 is the weighted average
past 3-month and 12-month trading volume of municipal bonds held by a fund. The trad-
ing volume variables are truncated at the top 1%.
The second measure is bid-ask spread (round-trip trading cost), also called dealer’s
markup. I obtain the estimates of trading costs for municipal bond round-trip transac-
tions between January 2001 to June 2015 from Chalmers, Wang and Liu (2016). A mu-
nicipal bond’s bid-ask spread over a period of 3 months (12 months) is the weighted aver-
age trading costs for all round-trip transactions in the period, using trade size as weight.
AvgSpread3 and AvgSpread12 is the weighted average past 3-month and 12-month bid-
ask spread of municipal bonds held by a fund. The bid-ask spread variables are truncated
at the top and bottom 1%.
The third measure is a modified version of Amihud (2002) liquidity measure. The
Amihud liquidity measures the price impact of a trade per unit traded. It is defined as
the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on a day. I adopt the modified
measure from Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter and Lando (2012). For each municipal bond in
day t, modified Amihud liquidity is defined as the daily average of absolute returns rj di-
vided by the trade size Qj (in million $) of consecutive transactions:
Amihudt =
1
Nt
Nt∑
j=1
|rj |
Qj
=
1
Nt
Nt∑
j=1
|Pj − Pj−1
Pj−1
|
Qj
,
where Nt is the number of returns on day t. At least two transactions are required
13
on a given day to calculate the daily Amihud liquidity measure. I define a municipal bond’s
3-month (12-month) Amihud liquidity as the median of daily Amihud liquidity in that
period. AvgAmihud3 and AvgAmihud12 are the weighted average past 3-month and 12-
month Amihud liquidity of municipal bonds held by a fund. The Amihud liquidity vari-
ables are truncated at the top 1%.
The forth measure is zero-trade. If a municipal bond does not appear in the MSRB
database in a month, I consider the bond as a zero-trade bond in that month. ZeroTrade3
and ZeroTrade12 are a fund’s portfolio weights in municipal bonds that have zero trading
activity in the past 3 months and 12 months. The zero-trade variables are truncated at
the top 1%.
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 Panel A shows the summary statistics for open-end fund characteristics. The
open-end fund sample consists of 890 funds, including 356 national funds (Morningstar
category in High Yield Muni, Muni National Long, Muni National Interm, and Muni
National Short) and 534 single-state funds. Fund size is positively skewed. The average
quarter-beginning NAV is 673.07 million, and the median fund size is 200.13 million. The
average open-end funds have 17.48 years since the inception of their oldest share classes.
Open-end funds have average annual expense ratio of 0.77% and turnover ratio of 28.11%.
The average funds have 18.32% net assets in institutional share class. There are 166 fund
families that manage open-end funds in my sample. Family size is also positively skewed.
The average family size is 12333.81 million and the median family size is 6599.2 million.
14
T
ab
le
1:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
O
p
en
-
an
d
C
lo
se
d
-e
n
d
F
u
n
d
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
op
en
-
an
d
cl
os
ed
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
s’
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
an
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
N
a
ti
on
a
l
is
a
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
-
ab
le
th
at
eq
u
al
s
1
fo
r
n
at
io
n
al
fu
n
d
s
an
d
0
fo
r
si
n
gl
e-
st
at
e
fu
n
d
s.
N
A
V
t
is
a
fu
n
d
’s
to
ta
l
n
et
as
se
t
va
lu
e
a
cr
o
ss
a
ll
sh
a
re
cl
a
ss
es
a
t
th
e
en
d
of
q
u
ar
te
r
t.
A
g
e
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
y
ea
rs
si
n
ce
th
e
in
ce
p
ti
on
of
a
fu
n
d
’s
ol
d
es
t
sh
ar
e
cl
as
s.
E
x
p
en
se
is
th
e
N
A
V
-w
ei
g
h
te
d
av
er
ag
e
an
n
u
al
ex
p
en
se
ra
ti
o
ac
ro
ss
al
l
sh
ar
e
cl
as
se
s
of
a
fu
n
d
.
T
u
rn
ov
er
is
th
e
N
A
V
-w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
an
n
u
a
l
tu
rn
ov
er
ra
ti
o
ac
ro
ss
al
l
sh
ar
e
cl
as
se
s
of
a
fu
n
d
.
I
n
st
it
u
ti
on
a
l
is
th
e
N
A
V
of
a
fu
n
d
’s
in
st
it
u
ti
on
al
sh
ar
e
cl
as
s
as
a
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
th
e
fu
n
d
’s
N
A
V
.
F
a
m
il
y
N
A
V
is
th
e
to
ta
l
n
et
as
se
t
va
lu
e
of
al
l
op
en
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
s
(P
an
el
A
)
/c
lo
se
d
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
s
(P
an
el
B
)
in
th
e
fa
m
il
y.
A
n
o
p
en
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
’s
F
a
m
il
y
N
A
V
C
E
F
is
th
e
to
ta
l
n
et
as
se
t
va
lu
e
of
al
l
cl
os
ed
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
s
in
it
s
fu
n
d
fa
m
il
y
an
d
0
if
th
e
fa
m
il
y
d
o
es
n
o
t
m
a
n
a
g
e
cl
os
ed
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
.
A
fu
n
d
’s
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
F
lo
w
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
:
F
lo
w
t
=
N
A
V
t
−
N
A
V
t−
1
×
R
t
N
A
V
t−
1
,
w
h
er
e
R
t
is
th
e
fu
n
d
’s
q
u
a
rt
er
ly
g
ro
ss
re
tu
rn
.
F
lo
w
V
ol
1
2
(F
lo
w
V
ol
2
4
)
is
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
of
a
fu
n
d
’s
m
on
th
ly
fl
ow
s
in
th
e
p
as
t
12
(2
4)
m
o
n
th
s.
R
et
V
ol
1
2
is
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
of
a
fu
n
d
’s
m
on
th
ly
n
et
re
tu
rn
s
in
th
e
p
as
t
12
m
on
th
s.
A
fu
n
d
’s
N
A
V
re
tu
rn
(R
et
)
is
th
e
w
ei
g
h
te
d
av
er
a
g
e
n
et
re
tu
rn
of
al
l
sh
ar
e
cl
as
se
s.
A
fu
n
d
’s
p
as
t
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
(P
a
st
P
er
f
)
is
av
er
ag
e
m
on
th
ly
al
p
h
a
in
th
e
p
as
t
1
2
m
o
n
th
,
es
ti
m
a
te
d
fr
o
m
a
re
gr
es
si
on
of
n
et
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
ex
ce
ss
st
o
ck
m
ar
k
et
an
d
b
on
d
m
ar
ke
t
re
tu
rn
s.
I
u
se
C
R
S
P
va
lu
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
m
a
rk
et
in
d
ex
a
s
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
st
o
ck
m
ar
ke
t
an
d
V
an
gu
ar
d
to
ta
l
b
on
d
m
ar
ke
t
in
d
ex
fu
n
d
as
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
th
e
b
on
d
m
ar
k
et
.
A
fu
n
d
’s
q
u
a
rt
er
ly
a
lp
h
a
(α
)
is
th
e
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
cu
m
u
la
ti
ve
ab
n
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
,
es
ti
m
at
ed
fr
om
a
re
gr
es
si
on
of
th
e
fu
n
d
’s
m
on
th
ly
n
et
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
o
n
ex
ce
ss
st
o
ck
m
ar
ke
t
an
d
b
on
d
m
ar
ke
t
re
tu
rn
s
in
th
e
p
as
t
24
m
on
th
s.
P
an
el
A
:
O
p
en
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
N
M
ea
n
S
T
D
P
5
P
10
P
25
P
50
P
7
5
P
9
0
P
9
5
N
a
ti
on
a
l
30
05
1
0.
38
04
0.
48
55
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
1.
00
0
0
1
.0
0
0
0
1
.0
0
0
0
N
A
V
t
($
M
)
30
05
1
68
2.
68
55
16
90
.1
85
1
21
.9
85
4
35
.0
42
4
81
.4
14
0
20
1.
92
64
59
5.
76
7
9
1
6
1
5
.0
6
3
9
2
7
7
8
.2
2
5
8
N
A
V
t−
1
($
M
)
30
05
1
67
3.
07
37
16
60
.8
28
5
21
.8
18
0
34
.8
27
8
80
.9
72
9
20
0.
12
70
58
6.
90
5
6
1
5
8
9
.4
6
8
3
2
7
2
3
.7
9
2
1
E
x
p
en
se
(%
)
29
56
0
0.
76
51
0.
24
22
0.
35
52
0.
49
46
0.
61
93
0.
76
74
0.
92
6
9
1
.0
4
0
0
1
.1
1
2
0
T
u
rn
ov
er
(%
)
27
75
4
28
.1
12
9
32
.8
06
5
5.
00
00
7.
00
00
11
.0
00
0
18
.0
00
0
32
.0
0
0
0
5
6
.0
0
0
0
8
7
.0
0
0
0
A
g
e
(y
ea
rs
)
30
05
1
17
.4
84
7
8.
38
32
3.
75
00
6.
41
67
11
.7
50
0
17
.5
00
0
22
.9
16
7
2
7
.8
3
3
3
3
0
.0
8
3
3
I
n
st
it
u
ti
on
a
l
(%
)
30
05
1
0.
18
32
0.
32
05
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
22
2
5
0
.8
2
3
1
0
.9
5
9
2
F
a
m
il
y
N
A
V
($
M
)
30
05
1
12
33
3.
81
18
26
7.
01
74
.3
6
22
4.
78
13
82
.2
9
65
99
.2
0
13
26
8.
9
9
3
1
3
7
2
.6
3
5
5
5
8
0
.5
9
F
a
m
il
y
N
A
V
C
E
F
($
M
)
30
05
1
20
65
.0
8
59
40
.6
6
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
72
7.
4
1
3
0
2
8
.1
0
2
1
8
6
3
.5
8
F
lo
w
(%
)
29
10
1
0.
02
57
6.
34
41
-7
.7
65
7
-5
.5
54
7
-3
.0
68
4
-0
.9
00
6
1.
81
3
4
5
.9
2
0
3
1
0
.7
4
9
0
F
lo
w
V
ol
1
2
(%
)
28
88
7
1.
47
16
1.
10
32
0.
34
96
0.
44
57
0.
69
03
1.
14
00
1.
91
3
8
2
.9
6
6
5
3
.8
0
8
4
15
T
ab
le
1
-
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
N
M
ea
n
S
T
D
P
5
P
10
P
25
P
50
P
7
5
P
9
0
P
9
5
F
lo
w
V
ol
2
4
(%
)
28
49
5
1.
62
67
1.
06
99
0.
46
31
0.
57
64
0.
85
29
1.
33
71
2.
09
0
6
3
.1
1
6
6
3
.8
5
4
9
P
a
st
P
er
f
(%
)
29
39
0
-0
.0
06
9
0.
36
96
-0
.4
83
8
-0
.3
33
7
-0
.1
72
1
-0
.0
32
0
0.
12
6
3
0
.3
2
3
7
0
.5
0
0
4
R
et
V
ol
1
2
(%
)
29
39
0
1.
16
59
0.
67
46
0.
34
64
0.
51
51
0.
71
38
1.
06
30
1.
48
2
5
1
.9
0
1
9
2
.2
4
9
8
R
et
(%
)
28
91
0
0.
98
81
1.
86
14
-2
.4
91
9
-1
.0
06
2
0.
06
37
0.
95
58
2.
06
8
0
3
.3
3
7
9
3
.9
6
1
0
A
lp
h
a
(%
)
28
17
5
0.
15
09
1.
47
46
-2
.0
94
8
-1
.4
15
8
-0
.5
73
4
0.
08
42
0.
92
5
6
1
.7
9
0
3
2
.4
5
1
4
P
an
el
B
:
C
lo
se
d
-e
n
d
fu
n
d
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
N
M
ea
n
S
T
D
P
5
P
10
P
25
P
50
P
7
5
P
9
0
P
9
5
N
a
ti
on
a
l
11
94
3
0.
43
82
0.
49
62
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
1.
00
0
0
1
.0
0
0
0
1
.0
0
0
0
N
A
V
t
($
M
)
11
94
3
25
6.
33
10
26
5.
52
48
30
.6
48
0
37
.9
94
6
73
.1
80
9
17
1.
75
98
33
4.
65
4
0
5
8
9
.3
1
6
3
7
5
1
.4
0
8
2
N
A
V
t−
1
($
M
)
11
94
3
25
5.
50
83
26
4.
94
34
30
.7
00
7
38
.0
90
1
73
.1
72
3
17
1.
12
36
33
2.
30
9
0
5
8
7
.8
3
2
5
7
4
8
.3
2
6
8
E
x
p
en
se
(%
)
11
73
5
1.
11
45
0.
34
65
0.
63
00
0.
73
00
0.
92
00
1.
11
00
1.
25
0
0
1
.4
7
0
0
1
.7
1
0
0
T
u
rn
ov
er
(%
)
10
79
2
18
.3
79
8
16
.7
92
2
3.
00
00
5.
00
00
9.
00
00
15
.0
00
0
22
.0
00
0
3
5
.0
0
0
0
4
6
.0
0
0
0
A
g
e
(y
ea
rs
)
11
94
3
12
.9
12
5
6.
22
92
2.
75
00
4.
33
33
8.
33
33
12
.8
33
3
17
.5
0
0
0
2
1
.4
1
6
7
2
3
.0
8
3
3
F
a
m
il
y
N
A
V
($
M
)
11
94
3
14
96
8.
58
97
11
.3
0
55
7.
27
96
0.
01
30
76
.5
4
17
02
7.
32
24
14
9.
6
6
2
5
3
8
0
.2
8
2
6
7
4
0
.8
9
R
et
(%
)
11
62
6
1.
55
25
3.
72
81
-6
.0
65
7
-2
.6
99
3
-0
.1
50
9
1.
84
88
3.
89
6
8
5
.7
6
3
9
6
.9
2
3
4
A
lp
h
a
(%
)
11
21
1
0.
20
48
3.
27
32
-5
.1
08
2
-3
.2
90
5
-1
.2
63
4
0.
26
26
1.
81
1
5
3
.6
1
2
2
5
.3
5
1
2
16
Open-end fund flow and performance have large variations in the cross section. The
standard deviation of quarterly flows is 6.34% and the top and bottom 5 percentiles are
10.74% and -7.77%. The average past 12-month flow volatility is 1.47%. Open-end funds’
average past 1-year performance is -6.29 basis points with a standard deviation of 0.14%.
The average quarterly net return is 0.98% and the average quarterly alpha is 0.15%, sug-
gesting that open-end municipal bond funds, on average, do not outperform the market.
However, fund performance have large variations in the cross section. The bottom 5th
percentile of quarterly alpha is -2.09% and the top 5th percentile is 2.45%.
Table 1 Panel B shows the summary statistics for closed-end fund performance
and characteristics. The closed-end fund sample consists of 303 funds, including 135 na-
tional and 168 single-state funds. The average quarter-beginning NAV for closed-end
funds is 255.51 million and the median fund size is 171.12 million. The average closed-
end funds have 12.9 years in age. Closed-end funds charge higher expense and fees than
open-end funds. The average annual expense ratio for closed-end funds is 1.11%. The av-
erage turnover ratio is 18.38%. There are 26 fund families in the closed-end fund sample.
The average family size is 14968.58 million. Closed-end funds have higher return and al-
pha than open-end funds. The average closed-end funds earn 1.55% net return and 0.2%
abnormal return per quarter. Closed-end funds performance have larger variations in
the cross section than open-end funds. The bottom and top 5th percentiles of closed-end
funds quarterly alpha are -5.11% and 5.35%.
Table 2 Panel A shows the summary statistics for cash positions of open-end funds.
Both Morningstar and CRSP report low cash holdings for open-end municipal bond funds.
The average cash position is 1.52% according to Morningstar. The median cash position
is 0.73% and the top and bottom 25th percentiles are 0% and 4.36%. Open-end munici-
pal funds rarely take short positions in cash and cash equivalents. The bottom 5th per-
centile of cash position is 0, suggesting that less than 5% open-end funds use leverage.
The cash positions from CRSP are consistent with those from Morningstar. According
to CRSP, open-end municipal bond funds, on average, hold 2.23% net assets in cash and
17
cash equivalents. The top and bottom 25th percentiles of cash positions are 0% and 6%.
Table 2 Panel A also shows the summary statistics for open-end funds’ portfolio liquidity.
The average open-end funds hold 46.21% (28.89%) net assets in municipal bonds that are
not traded in the past 3 (12) months. The average 3-month (12-month) trading volume
of municipal bonds held by an open-end fund is 4.62 million (17.28 million) in par value.
The average 3-month (12-month) bid-ask spread of municipal bonds held by an open-end
fund is 66.5 (30.24) basis points. The average 3-month (12-month) Amihud liquidity of
municipal bonds held by an open-end fund is 0.3% (0.29%)12.
Table 2 Panel B compares open-end fund characteristics and liquidity by family
types. I divide open-end funds into two groups by whether the fund family simultane-
ously manages open- and closed-end funds. Among the 166 open-end fund families in my
sample, 23 families also manage closed-end funds. Open-end funds in these 23 families
tend to have lower flow volatility and hold significantly less cash and less liquid munic-
ipal bonds in their portfolios. The average cash holding from Morningstar is 1.39% for
open-end funds in families managing both open- and closed-end funds, while the average
cash holding is 1.52% for open-end funds in families managing only open-end funds. I find
consistent results using cash positions from CRSP. Open-end funds in families manag-
ing both open- and closed-end funds, on average, hold 1.54% cash, while those in families
managing only open-end funds hold 1.68% cash. The mean cash holdings across the two
groups are significantly different with p-value less than 1%. Open-end funds also hold sig-
nificantly less liquid municipal bonds, measured by the average bid-ask spread and Ami-
hud liquidity when the fund families manage closed-end funds at the same time. I do not
find significant difference between open-end fund’s portfolio liquidity, measured by the
average trading volume.
12See Appendix Table C1 for the correlation matrix for the portfolio liquidity measures.
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Table 2 Panel C and Panel D separately show the univariate comparison of cash
holding and portfolio liquidity across funds in different types of families for national and
single-state funds. National open-end funds across the two types of families have simi-
lar past flow volatility. But national open-end funds hold significantly less cash and more
illiquid municipal bonds, proxied by high Amihud liquidity, when their fund families also
manage closed-end funds. The univariate comparison results are different for single-state
funds. Single-state open-end funds have more volatile monthly flows if their fund families
only manage open-end funds. They also hold more liquid municipal bonds in their port-
folios. The univariate tests show that national and single-state funds behave differently in
cash holdings and liquidity management. Therefore, I include a National dummy variable
in all multivariate regressions.
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CHAPTER III
FLOW-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY
I test the flow-performance relationship for municipal bond funds following Sirri and Tu-
fano (1998). I regress funds’ quarterly flows on rank of past performance:
Flow = α+ β1LowPerf + β2MidPerf + β3HighPerf + controls,
where LowPerf , MidPerf and HighPerf represent the rank of a fund’s past 1-year per-
formance. For each investment style and each month, I rank funds’ past performance
from poorest, with percentile rank as 0, to best, with percentile rank as 1. I construct
three variables: LowPerf , MidPerf and HighPerf which represent funds with perfor-
mance in the bottom, the middle three and the top quintile:
LowPerf = min(Rank, 0.2)
MidPerf = min(0.6, Rank − LowPerf)
HighPerf = Rank − LowPerf −MidPerf .
By separating funds’ performance into quintiles, I can capture the asymmetric responses
of investor flows to good and poor past performance.
In addition to the rank regression, I test open-end municipal bond funds’ flow-performance
relationship following Goldstein, Jiang and Ng (2017):
Flow = α+ β1Negative+ β2PastPerf + β3Negative× PastPerf + controls,
where Negative is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a fund’s past performance is
negative and 0 otherwise.
Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the average quarterly and monthly
flows for 20 equal groups of open-end funds according to their past performance. The
graphs show that municipal bond fund flows are sensitive to past performance and monthly
flows are more sensitive to poor past performance than quarterly flows.
Table 3 Panel A shows the flow-performance relationship following Sirri and Tu-
23
fano (1998). Using both OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions, I find the coefficients on
LowPerf , MidPerf and HighPerf to be significantly positive, suggesting that investor
flows are sensitive to municipal bond funds’ past performance.
Table 3 Panel B shows the flow-performance relationship following Goldstein, Jiang
and Ng (2017). The coefficients on PastPerf are significantly positive, suggesting that
investor flows are sensitive to municipal bond funds’ past performance. When I use monthly
flows as dependent variable, the coefficients on the interaction between PastPerf and
Nagative dummy are significantly positive, suggesting that monthly flows are even more
sensitive to poor past performance. For an open-end fund with negative past performance,
1% decrease in its past performance will lead to 0.44% outflows per month. Table 3 Panel
B also shows the flow-performance relationships for subsamples of national and single-
state funds. The monthly flow-performance relationship in national funds is close to lin-
ear. The monthly flow-performance relationship is concave for single-state funds: investor
flows respond to both good and poor past performance, but are more sensitive to poor
past performance.
The flow-performance relationship documented in Table 3 indicates that municipal
bond fund managers are punished for poor performance. Since the municipal bond mar-
ket has low liquidity, the high flow-performance sensitivity in municipal bond funds mo-
tivates fund managers to actively manage fund liquidity. I explore municipal bond funds’
liquidity management skills in the following sections.
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Figure 1: Quarterly Flow-performance Relationship - Rank of Past Performance
This graph shows the average quarterly flows of open-end municipal bond funds as a
function of their past performance rankings. For each quarter and investment style, open-
end funds are divided into 20 equal groups based on their past 1-year performance. For
each group, I calculate the average quarterly flows. The x-axis represents performance
rankings for these 20 groups from the poorest (ranked as 0) to the best (ranked as 1).
The y-axis is the mean quarterly flows for each group.
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Figure 2: Monthly Flow-performance Relationship - Rank of Past Performance
This graph shows the average quarter flows of open-end municipal bond funds as a func-
tion of their past performance rankings. For each month and investment style, open-end
funds are divided into 20 equal groups based on their past 1-year performance. For each
group, I calculate the average monthly flows. The x-axis represents performance rankings
for these 20 groups from the poorest (ranked as 0) to the best (ranked as 1). The y-axis
is the mean monthly flows for each group.
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Figure 3: Quarterly Flow-performance Relationship - Past Performance
This graph shows the average quarterly flows of open-end municipal bond funds as a
function of their past performance. For each quarter and investment style, open-end
funds are divided into 20 equal groups based on their past 1-year performance. For each
group, I calculate the average quarterly flows. The x-axis represents average past perfor-
mance for these 20 groups. The y-axis is the mean quarterly flows for each group.
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Figure 4: Monthly Flow-performance Relationship - Past Performance
This graph shows the average quarter flows of open-end municipal bond funds as a func-
tion of their past performance rankings. For each month and investment style, open-end
funds are divided into 20 equal groups based on their past 1-year performance. For each
group, I calculate the average monthly flows.The x-axis represents average past perfor-
mance for these 20 groups. The y-axis is the mean monthly flows for each group.
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CHAPTER IV
LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
4.1 Cash Holding and Flow Management
Table 4 Panel A shows the relationship between open-end municipal bond funds’ cash
position and their past flow volatility:
Cash = α+ βF lowV ol12 + γPortLiquidityt−1 + Controls.
The coefficient β is significantly positive, suggesting that fund managers hold more cash
when the fund has higher liquidity risk, measured by flow volatility in the past 12 months13.
When an open-end funds’ flow volatility increase by 1%, the fund will hold additional
0.22% of its net assets in cash and cash equivalents. Cash holding is negatively associated
with fund size and positively associated with institutional share. Cash holding is nega-
tively associated with family size. Open-end funds in large fund families hold less cash,
suggesting economies of scale in liquidity management at family level. The coefficients
on FamilyOEF,CEF is insignificant, suggesting that whether the fund families manage
closed-end funds or not does not affect open-end funds’ cash holdings. I also find modest
evidence that a fund’s cash position is associated with its portfolio liquidity. Cash hold-
ing is negatively associated with AvgV olume and positively associated with AvgSpread,
suggesting that open-end funds hold more cash when they hold more illiquid municipal
bonds.
Table 4 Panel B studies how open-end municipal bond funds use cash in flow man-
agement. In column (1) to (4), I regress cash position changes on concurrent quarterly
flows:
∆Cash = α+ βF low + Controls
∆Cash = α+ β1LargeOutflow + β2Outflow + β3Inflow + β4LargeInflow + Controls.
13In untabulated tests, I regress the cash holdings and portfolio liquidity of open-end funds on their
flow volatility in the past 24 months, FlowV ol24. The regression results are similar.
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If fund managers proportionally liquidate holdings to meet investor redemptions, beta
will be close to 0. If fund managers use cash to accommodate inflows and outflows, β will
be positive. The coefficient β is significantly positive, suggesting that fund managers use
cash to accommodate investor flows and avoid flow-driven transactions. Open-end funds
with inflows (outflows) that equal to 100% of their net assets increase (decrease) their
cash positions by 2.4%.
Column (5) to (8) in Table 4 Panel B show the piece-wise regression results. LargeOutflow
and LargeInflow equal to Flow when a fund’s quarterly flow is in the bottom or top
5% and 0 otherwise. Outflow and Inflow equal to Flow when a fund’s quarterly flow
is between 0 and the bottom or top 5th percentile and 0 otherwise. The piece-wise re-
gression results are consistent with the OLS regression results. Fund managers use cash
holdings to accommodate investor flows and they do not behave differently across inflows
and outflows. I find modest evidence that open-end funds use less cash at extreme flows.
The coefficient on LargeOutflow (β1 = 0.028) is lower than the coefficient on Outflow
(β2 = 0.048) with p-value close to 10%. Distressed open-end funds can experience out-
flows larger than 7.77%, but the average municipal bond funds only hold less than 2% net
assets in cash. Since the low cash holdings are not enough to meet large investor redemp-
tions, I expect that open-end funds use unconventional liquidity management tools when
they experience large outflows.
4.2 Portfolio Liquidity and Flow Management
Table 5 Panel A shows the relationship between a fund’s portfolio liquidity and its past
flow volatility. I find evidence that the monthly flow volatility of open-end municipal
bond funds is positively associated with the average trading volume and is negatively
associated with the average bid-ask spread and Amihud liquidity of municipal bonds in
their portfolios, suggesting that funds with higher liquidity risk hold more liquid munici-
pal bonds. When an open-end fund’s flow volatility increases by 1%, the average trading
volume increases by 1.52 million, the average bid-ask spread decreases by 2.3 basis points
37
and the average Amihud price impact decrease by 0.5 basis point. The portfolio liquidity
of open-end funds is also related to fund characteristics. Portfolio liquidity is positively
associated with fund size and turnover ratio and is negatively associated with fund age
and expense ratio.
Table 5 Panel B shows the relationship between change in portfolio liquidity and
concurrent flows. A fund’s quarterly flow is positively associated with change in its port-
folio’s average trading volume. A fund with 100% quarterly inflow (outflow) increases
(decreases) the average trading volume of its municipal bond holdings by 5.78 million
- 16.7 million. A fund’s quarterly flow is negatively associated with change in the zero-
trade municipal bond weight, average bid-ask spread and Amihud liquidity. A fund that
experience 100% inflow (outflow) in a quarter decreases (increases) the holding in zero-
trading municipal bonds by 1.75% - 6.61%. A fund that experience 100% inflow (out-
flow) in a quarter decreases (increases) its portfolio’s average bid-ask spread by 27 -47
basis points and average Amihud liquidity by 0.04% - 0.05%. There results provide ev-
idence that open-end funds use more liquid municipal bonds to accommodate investor
flows. This finding is consistent with the previous literature in corporate bond fund liq-
uidity management. For example, Jiang, Li and Wang (2016) find that corporate bond
mutual funds sell relatively liquid corporate bonds first to fulfill investor redemptions.
Manconi, Massa and Yasuda (2012) find that mutual funds with the most negative flows
significantly reduce relatively liquid corporate bond holdings but retain illiquid securitized
bonds during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Table 5 Panel C shows the piece-wise regression of portfolio liquidity change on
fund flows. The coefficients on the flow variables are statistically significant and consis-
tent with the results in Panel B. The coefficient on LargeOutflow is statistically similar
to that on Outflow, suggesting that open-end municipal bond funds respond to modest
flows and extreme flows in the same way in portfolio liquidity management.
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Table 4 and Table 5 provide evidence of active liquidity management in open-end
municipal bond funds. I find evidence that open-end funds build liquidity buffers when
they have high funding liquidity risk. I also find that open-end funds use cash and liquid
securities to accommodate inflows and outflows in order to reduce the costs of flow-driven
transactions. I find modest evidence that fund rely less on cash management in extreme
outflows. I expect that open-end funds do not have enough cash to meet large investor
redemptions. Therefore, they use unconventional liquidity management tools when they
are in distress. In the next section, I explore the unconventional liquidity management
tool, namely cross-trading with funds in the same family.
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CHAPTER V
CROSS-TRADING AND LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
5.1 Measure of Cross-trading and Matched-sample Methodology
Since investment funds are not required to publicly disclose any cross-trades conducted in
the family internal market, the sizes and prices of cross-trades are not observable. A com-
mon method in the cross-subsidization literature is to use offsetting holding changes be-
tween two funds as estimations of cross-trades. I follow Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006)
and Chuprinin, Massa and Schumacher (2015) to construct cross-trading variables and to
test the relationship between fund flows and cross-trading between open- and closed-end
funds.
I use a matched-sample methodology to test whether open-end funds cross-trade
with affiliated closed-end funds. I look at the offsetting holding changes between open-
and closed-end funds in the same family, as well as the offsetting holding changes between
open- and closed-end funds that belong to different families. If family strategies exist in
cross-trading activities, I expect that the offsetting holding changes between open- and
closed-end funds in the same family are significantly larger than those between open-
and closed-end funds belonging to different families. Moreover, if fund families use cross-
trading in liquidity management, I expect that the offsetting holding changes between
open- and affiliated closed-end funds are associated with open-end fund flows.
For each open-end fund j in family F , I assume that it can cross-trade with the set
J of affiliated closed-end funds that belong to the same family F . I also assume that it
can cross-trade with the set J of unaffiliated closed-end funds that do not belong to fam-
ily F . The pair of open and affiliated closed-end funds is called actual pair. The pair of
open- and unaffiliated closed-end funds is called matched pair.
For each open- and closed-end fund pair j − J , I consider all the municipal bonds
that are sold by open-end fund j and simultaneously bought by closed-end fund J . By
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looking at such offsetting holding changes14, I estimate the largest possible number of
municipal bond shares that could have been traded between the pair of funds. The up-
per bound of cross-trading shares is the minimum between the number of shares sold by
open-end fund j and bought by closed-end fund J . I multiply this number by the price of
municipal bonds at the beginning of the quarter to estimate cross-trading volume, scaled
by the total NAV of the pair of funds. This variable measures cross-sale from open-end
fund j to closed-end fund set J :
CrossSalej,J,t =
∑
i
Pi,t−1 ×min(Sj,i,t, BJ,i,t)
NAVj,t−1 +NAVJ,t−1
,
where Sj,i,t is the shares of municipal bond i sold by open-end fund j in quarter t, and
BJ,i,t is the shares of municipal bond i bought by closed-end fund J in quarter t. Pi,t−1 is
the price of municipal bond i at the beginning of quarter t15.
Similarly, I construct a variable that estimates open-end fund j′s cross-buy from
closed-end fund J :
CrossBuyj,J,t =
∑
i
Pi,t−1 ×min(Bj,i,t, SJ,i,t)
NAVj,t−1 +NAVJ,t−1
I also construct total cross-trade and net cross-trade variables as follows:
CrossTradej,J,t = CrossSalej,J,t + CrossBuyj,J,t
NetCrossSalej,J,t = CrossSalej,J,t − CrossBuyj,J,t
At last, I construct CrossTradeTurnover as the dollar value of cross-trades scaled
by the NAV of open-end fund j:
∑ P ×min(Sj , BJ) + P ×min(Bj , SJ)
NAVj,t−1
.
Table 6 shows summary statistics for cross-trading between open- and closed-end
14One concern in using holding data to estimate cross-trading is that funds have different financial
year-end dates and portfolio dates. When two funds have different portfolio dates in a quarter, offsetting
holding changes are less likely to be cross-trades. 94.58% of open-end fund quarterly portfolios and 74.7%
of closed-end fund quarterly portfolios in my sample have portfolio dates the same as calendar quarter-end
dates. Since the majority fund report their portfolios at the end of March, June, September and Decem-
ber, mismatch of holding periods should not be a major concern.
15Municipal bonds are not traded in a centralized market. Therefore, the month-end price is not pub-
licly available. I use MSRB municipal bond trading data and Morningstar municipal bond fund holding
data to estimate month-end bond prices. See Appendix A for the detail description of municipal bond
price estimation process.
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funds for actual and matched pairs. The sample consists of 345 open-end funds in the
23 families that manage both open- and closed-end funds. I construct 9047 actual cross-
trading pairs and the same amount of matched pairs16. 1183 (780) actual pairs have non-
zero CrossSale (CrossBuy) variable, and 2094 (1551) matched pairs have non-zero CrossSale
(CrossBuy) variable. The cross-trading variables in actual j − J pairs are significantly
larger than those in matched pairs. The average value of CrossSale (CrossBuy) is 7.11%
(6.49%) of the aggregated net assets for the actual cross-trading pairs, but only 0.75%
(0.75%) for the matched cross-trading pairs. The actual pairs’ closed-end fund sets J , on
average, have 22 closed-end funds and 5764 million in aggregate net assets. The matched
pairs’ closed-end fund sets have 172 closed-end funds and 44822 million net assets. The
univariate comparison shows that open-end funds have more offsetting holding changes
with affiliated closed-end funds than with unaffiliated closed-end funds. However, it seems
that a part of the difference is driven by the fact that the aggregate set of unaffiliated
closed-end funds is larger than that of affiliated closed-end funds. In the multivariate
analysis, I control for the size of closed-end fund set J .
5.2 Fund Flows and Cross-trading between Open- and Closed-end Funds
I run the following regressions to test whether fund families coordinate cross-trades be-
tween open- and closed-end funds to provide liquidity to distressed open-end funds:
Crosstradej,J = α+ β1Affiliatedj,J + β2Flowj + β3Affiliatedj,J × Flowj + Controls,
where Affiliated is a dummy variable that equals 1 for actual pairs and 0 for matched
pairs. I use CrossTradeTurnover to control for generic difference in funds’ trading be-
havior. I use Ln(NAVJ) to control for the quantity of available cross-trading closed-end
funds.
16I drop 10 observations with cross-trading variables larger than 100%.
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I also run the following piece-wise regression:
Crosstradej,J = α+ β1Affiliatedj,J + β2LargeOutflowj + β3Affiliatedj,J ×
LargeOutflowj + γ1Outflowj + γ2Affiliatedj,J ×Outflowj + θ1Inflowj +
θ2Affiliatedj,J×Inflowj+δ1LargeInflowj+δ2Affiliatedj,J×LargeInflowj+Controls.
I expect that fund families only use cross-trading as liquidity management channel in ex-
treme situations. Therefore, I expect the coefficient β3 to be significantly negative while
the coefficients γ2 and θ2 to be insignificant.
Table 7 Column (1) - (4) show the relationship between cross-trading and open-
end funds’ flows. The coefficients on Affiliated dummy, Flow and the interaction are
insignificant, suggesting that cross-trading between open- and closed-end funds is not lin-
early related to open-end fund flows. This finding is not surprising since I expect that
cross-trading is only used as a liquidity management channel when open-end funds are in
distress. I use piece-wise regression to test whether cross-trading is associated with ex-
treme flows of open-end funds. Table 7 Column (5) - (8) show the piece-wise regression
results. Consistent with my hypothesis, the coefficient, β3, on the interaction between
Affiliated and LargeOutflow is significantly negative. Moreover, the coefficients on
other flow interactions are mostly insignificant. This result provides evidence that cross-
trading between open- and closed-end funds is mostly used as an alternative liquidity
management channel when open-end funds are in distress. The coefficient (β3 = −0.1336)
is larger in magnitude using CrossSale as dependent variable (Column (5)) than that
(β3 = −0.0432) using CrossBuy as dependent variable (Column (6)). Therefore, the net
effect is that open-end funds cross-sell to affiliated closed-end funds when they are in dis-
tress.
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I find a significantly positive association (δ2 = 0.0608) between CrossBuy and
LargeInflow for the actual cross-trading pairs. But the association is not statistically
significant between NetCrossSale and LargeInflow. This result suggests that although
open-end funds with excess cash can cross-buy from affiliated closed-end funds, these
cross-buy transactions tend to be limited in size. In untabulated tests, I use top and bot-
tom 10th percentiles as cutoffs to define large inflows and outflows. Compared with the
regression results in Table 7, the coefficient, β3, is negative but smaller in statistical sig-
nificance and economic magnitude. The negative association between open-end funds’
large outflows and CrossSale and the lack of association between open-end funds’ quar-
terly flows and cross-trading provide evidence that fund families use cross-trading as an
alternative liquidity management channel for distressed open-end funds.
Table 7 also shows the relationship between cross-trading and open-end fund char-
acteristics. Open-end funds’ investment style and size are strongly related to cross-trading.
National dummy is positively correlated with CrossSale, but not correlated with CrossBuy,
suggesting that fund families provide more liquidity support to national funds. All cross-
trading variables are positively associated with fund size, suggesting that fund families
provide more liquidity support to large funds. The coefficients on National and fund size
are consistent with each other because national funds, on average, are significantly larger
in size than single-state funds. I also find evidence that cross-trading is negatively associ-
ated with open-end funds’ family size.
In contrast to the cross-subsidization literature, cross-trading between open- and
closed-end funds is not associated with open-end fund characteristics, such as expense
ratios and age. Since open-end funds with high family value do not receive more cross-
trading, I conclude that cross-trading between open- and closed-end municipal bond funds
is a channel for liquidity management, rather than cross-subsidization.
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5.3 Cross-trading and Open-end Fund Performance
If fund families coordinate cross-trading to support distressed open-end funds, cross-trades
should not only correlate with open-end fund flows, but also happen at prices higher than
the fire sale prices. Distressed open-end funds avoid costly fire sales through cross-trading
in the family internal market. I run the following regression to test how does cross-trading
affect open-end fund performance:
Returnj = α+ βCrosstradej + Controls.
Crosstradej equals to the actual pair cross-trading variables in Table 6 and Table 7 when
the fund family manages both open- and closed-end funds, and 0 when the fund family
manages only open-end funds. If fund families use cross-trades to avoid fire sales, cross-
trading should alleviate the negative abnormal returns at fire sale events. However, an
endogeneity problem exists because fund families only use cross-trading when open-end
funds face large outflows, which lead to negative abnormal returns at forced liquidation.
Because of such endogeneity problem, I do not have a clear expectation on the sign of β.
Table 8 shows the relationship between return difference and cross-trading. Col-
umn (1) - (4) use quarterly net return and Column (5) - (8) use quarterly alpha as open-
end fund performance measure. CrossBuy is not correlated with fund performance, while
CrossSale and NetCrossSale is negatively correlated with fund performance. The neg-
ative association is possibly due to endogeneity because open-end funds only engage in
cross-trading when they experience large outflows, which can lead to forced liquidations. I
address the endogeneity problem in the robustness test.
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In conclusion, Table 7 provides evidence that fund families use cross-trading as an
alternative liquidity management tool. They only coordinate cross-trades between open-
and affiliated closed-end funds when open-end funds are in distress. The relationship be-
tween cross-trading and fund performance remains unclear due to the endogeneity prob-
lem: both cross-trading and poor performance are associated with large outflows. I ad-
dress this concern in Section 6.
5.4 Cross-trading and Closed-end Fund Characteristics
In Table 7, I find that open-end fund characteristics, such as fund age and expense ratio,
are not associated with cross-trading, suggesting that fund families are not playing fa-
voritism in coordinating cross-trades for open-end funds. In the following session, I test
whether closed-end fund characteristics are associated with cross-trading, specifically
whether the relationship between cross-trading and closed-end fund characteristics is con-
sistent with family-value maximization.
For each open-end fund j in fund family F , I assume that it can cross-trade with
every closed-end fund J1, J2, ..., JN in family F . Therefore, the open-end fund has N po-
tential cross-trading pairs j − J1, j − J2, ..., j − JN . Suppose a fund family F manages
M open-end funds and N closed-end funds, I will have M ×N open- and closed-end fund
pairs. For each pair, I construct the cross-trading variables as before. I run the following
regressions:
Cross− tradej,Jn = α+ βF lowj + CEFCharacteristics+ Controls
Cross− tradej,Jn = α+ βLargeOutflowj + γOutflowj + θInflowj + δLargeInflowj
+CEFCharacteristics+ Controls.
Table 9 shows the regression results. Consistent with the results in Table 7, cross-
trading is strongly associated with open-end funds extreme flows. CrossSale and NetCrossSale)
are negatively associated with LargeOutflow. CrossBuy is positively associated with
LargeInflow.
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I find a strong style effect in cross-trading. SameStyle is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when open- and closed-end fund in the cross-trading pair have the same style.
Cross-trading is positively correlated with SameStyle. The association between CrossSale
and SameStyle is much stronger than that between CrossBuy and SameStyle, suggest-
ing that open-end funds are more likely to cross-sell to closed-end funds with the same
investment style. I also find that closed-end fund style is associated with cross-trading.
CrossSale is positively correlated with NationalCEF dummy, but CrossBuy is not cor-
related with NationalCEF . This result suggests that open-end funds are more likely to
cross-sell to national closed-end funds. The style effect in Table 9 is highly consistent
with that in Table 7.
Table 9 shows that cross-trading between open- and closed-end funds is associ-
ated with the characteristics of closed-end funds. The expense ratio of closed-end funds,
ExpenseCEF , is negatively associated with CrossSale, but not associated with CrossBuy.
This negative association provides evidence that consistent with family-value maximiza-
tion, fund families prefer to use low-fee closed-end funds to provide liquidity to open-end
funds. Closed-end funds’ age is positively associated with cross-trading. Since mature
funds have less growth opportunity, the positive association is consistent with family-
value maximization. Closed-end funds’ family size is negatively associated with CrossSale,
but not associated with CrossBuy, suggesting that small fund families use more cross-
trading in liquidity management. The negative association between cross-trading and
family size is consistent with results in Table 7. In conclusion, the results in Table 9 sug-
gest that fund families prefer to use low-value closed-end funds to cross-trade with open-
end funds.
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CHAPTER VI
ROBUSTNESS
6.1 Cash Holding and Liquidity Management
Table 4 shows cash management in open-end municipal bond funds using cash data from
Morningstar. Since Morningstar only fund-quarter cash holdings for 49.84% of the sam-
ple, I use cash positions from CRSP as a robustness test of cash management in open-
end municipal bond funds. Table 10 Panel A shows the relationship between cash holding
and flow volatility. Consistent with results in Table 4, the coefficients on FlowV ol12 are
significantly positive, suggesting that funds hold more cash when they face high funding
liquidity risk. Column (3) of Table 10 Panel A shows cash management in the subsam-
ple of national open-end funds. The coefficient on FamilyOEF,CEF dummy is significantly
negative, suggesting that national municipal bond funds hold less cash when their fund
families manage closed-end funds at the same time. In contrast to national funds subsam-
ple, The coefficient on FamilyOEF,CEF dummy is significantly positive for the subsample
of single-state funds. Cross-trading is one possible explanation for this difference across
subsamples. Both Table 7 and Table 9 show that national open-end funds are more likely
to engage in cross-trading than single-state funds. Knowing that they have access to al-
ternative liquidity management tools in distress, national open-end funds hold less cash.
Table 10: Robustness Test of Open-end Fund Cash Holdings and Flow Management
This table shows open-end municipal bond funds’ liquidity management using cash and
cash equivalents. Panel A shows the regression of cash holding, Cashcrsp, on past flow
volatility. Panel B shows the regression of cash holding change, ∆Cashcrsp, on quarterly
flow. Fund flow and characteristics are defined in Table 1. Portfolio liquidity variables are
defined in Table 2. All regressions include style-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by fund.
Panel A: Level of cash holdings and past flow volatility
Full sample Full sample National Single-state
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FlowV ol12 0.3241*** 0.3228*** 0.3421*** 0.3131***
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Table 10 - Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(4.64) (4.64) (3.63) (3.08)
FamilyOEF,CEF 0.0851 -0.5214** 0.4122***
(0.63) (-2.00) (2.86)
National -0.0319 -0.0921
(-0.10) (-0.29)
Ln(NAVt−1) -0.1060 -0.0998 -0.1075 -0.1290
(-1.19) (-1.10) (-0.67) (-1.31)
Ln(Age) 0.2220 0.2119 0.1554 0.3519
(1.28) (1.22) (0.68) (1.29)
Expense -0.4668 -0.5208* -0.2740 -0.8701***
(-1.63) (-1.73) (-0.52) (-2.66)
Turnover 0.0149*** 0.0150*** 0.0162*** 0.0102**
(3.59) (3.62) (3.17) (2.33)
Institutional 0.3125 0.2979 0.4437 0.2137
(1.30) (1.24) (1.11) (0.83)
Ln(FamilyNAV ) -0.1419*** -0.1503*** -0.0602 -0.1960***
(-2.68) (-2.65) (-0.59) (-3.00)
Liquiditymkt 0.2444 0.2505 -1.1545 1.1595
(0.18) (0.18) (-0.45) (0.72)
Constant 1.2422* 1.3334* 1.0102 19.3819***
(1.72) (1.81) (0.99) (23.16)
Adj. R2 0.077 0.077 0.080 0.073
N 22838 22838 8398 14440
Panel B: Change in cash holdings and quarterly flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Flow 0.0274*** 0.0266***
(7.01) (6.89)
LargeOutflow 0.0118 0.0127
(1.31) (1.41)
Outflow 0.0257** 0.0272**
(2.24) (2.38)
Inflow 0.0443*** 0.0457***
(3.71) (3.84)
LargeInflow 0.0280*** 0.0257***
(4.91) (4.67)
National 0.0884 0.0658 0.1084 0.0874
(0.41) (0.31) (0.50) (0.41)
Ln(NAVt−1) -0.0034 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0034
(-0.29) (0.13) (-0.10) (0.29)
Ln(Age) 0.0646** 0.0541** 0.0754*** 0.0639**
(2.47) (2.15) (2.89) (2.53)
Expense 0.0712** 0.0716** 0.0743** 0.0782**
(2.04) (2.06) (2.07) (2.16)
Turnover 0.0009 0.0012** 0.0009 0.0012**
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Table 10 - Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1.55) (2.09) (1.51) (2.06)
Institutional 0.0324 0.0317 0.0271 0.0274
(1.05) (1.08) (0.86) (0.90)
Ln(FamilyNAV ) 0.0107 0.0104 0.0088 0.0085
(1.60) (1.56) (1.28) (1.23)
Liquiditymkt 0.1211 0.1759 0.1253 0.1800
(0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.17)
AvgV olume3,t−1 -0.0213*** -0.0216***
(-4.88) (-4.93)
AvgV olume12,t−1 -0.0062*** -0.0063***
(-5.59) (-5.65)
Constant -0.3373 -0.3249 -0.3904* -0.3725*
(-1.58) (-1.51) (-1.81) (-1.71)
Adj. R2 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.017
N 21168 21165 21168 21165
t-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 10 Panel B shows the relationship between cash position change and flow
management. Cash holding change is positively associated with quarterly flows, suggest-
ing that open-end municipal bond funds use cash to accommodate flows. Column (3) and
(4) show piece-wise regression results. The coefficients on LargeOutflow is insignificant,
while the coefficients on Outflow, Inflow and LargeInflow are significantly positive.
Consistent with results in Table 4, the piece-wise regressions show that open-end munic-
ipal bond funds use alternative liquidity management tools, instead of cash, in extreme
situations.
6.2 Cross-trading between Open- and Closed-end Funds
6.2.1 Cross-trading and Characteristic-matched Sample
Table 6 shows that the net asset value of and the number of funds in closed-end fund set
J are significantly larger for matched pairs than actual pairs. To address the concern that
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regression results in Table 7 is driven by the difference in closed-end fund size between ac-
tual and matched pair, I run the robustness test using a characteristic-matching method.
I use the matched-sample methodology in Section 5.1 to construct the actual cross-
trading pairs. For each open-end fund j in family F , I assume that it cross-trades with
the set J of affiliated closed-end funds that belong to the same family F . For each quar-
ter and each style, closed-end funds are sorted into four quartiles according to their fund
size, age or expense ratio. Each closed-end fund in the actual set J is randomly matched
to an unaffiliated closed-end fund that belongs to the same style and characteristic quar-
tile. The matched set J is the aggregate of these style- and characteristics-matched unaf-
filiated closed-end funds.
Table 11 shows the summary statistics of cross-trades for actual and matched pairs.
Panel A, B and C separately show the univariate comparisons between actual cross-trading
pairs and size-, age- and expense-matched pairs. The average size of closed-end fund set J
in the actual pairs is similar to that in the matched pairs. The cross-trading variables in
actual pairs are significantly larger than those in matched pairs.
Table 12 shows the relationship between cross-trading and open-end fund flows.
I use CrossSale and NetCrossSale as dependent variables. The regression results are
highly consistent with that in Table 7. The coefficients on Affiliated is significantly
positive. The piece-wise regression results show that cross-trading is significantly asso-
ciated with open-end funds’ large outflows. The coefficients on the interaction between
Affiliated and LargeOutflow are significantly negative, suggesting that distressed open-
end funds cross-sell to closed-end funds in the family internal market. The coefficients on
other flow variables are insignificant. In the untabulated robustness test, I also find that
CrossBuy is not associated with open-end fund’s inflows. Consistent with Table 7, Ta-
ble 12 shows that large national open-end funds are more likely to engage in cross-trading
and that cross-trading is not associated with open-end fund characteristics. The results
in 12 provide additional evidence that fund families use cross-trading as an alternative
liquidity management tool when open-end funds are in distress.
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6.2.2 Cross-trading Policy of Investment Advisors
I also run robustness tests using cross-trading policies of open-end fund investment ad-
visors. An investment advisory firm with a strict policy that allows little cross-trading
opportunities cannot use cross-trading to provide liquidity to distressed open-end funds.
Therefore, I expect that liquidity-motivated cross-trading only exists in fund families that
allow cross-trading.
The SEC requires investment advisors to disclose their cross-trading policies17 in
Item 8B of Form ADV. Investment advisors answer yes or no to three questions about
whether they allow cross-trading between two clients or not18. I use the Agency Cross-
trading (ACT) measure following Casavecchia and Tiwari (2016) and Del Guercio, Genc
and Tran (2017)19. ACT with a value of 0 means that the investment advisor is not al-
lowed to coordinate cross-trading between two clients, and a value of 3 means that the in-
vestment advisor have the most opportunities to engage in agency cross-trading. HighACT
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 when ACT ≥ 2 and 0 when ACT < 2. Most fund
families, such as Nuveen, Pimco and Dreyfus, hold the same cross-trading policies across
their investment subsidiaries and throughout the sample period. I only find 4 fund fam-
ilies that changed their cross-trading policies over time, including BlackRock, Delaware
Investments, Invesco and Legg Mason.
I divide open-end funds into two subsamples according to their investment advisors’
cross-trading policies and test whether the cross-trading activities are different in the two
subsamples. Table 13 shows the univariate comparison of cross-trading between the high
ACT and low ACT subsamples. I compare the actual cross-trading across the two sub-
17See Table 3 of Casavecchia and Tiwari (2016) or SEC Form ADV for the list of questions regarding
agency cross-trading.
18Investment advisors’ answers to Form ADV are downloaded from the SEC website. I use hand-collect
information on investment advisors’ SEC file number to merge the Form ADV data with Morningstar
dataset. I match 7932 fund-quarter observations from 19 fund families.
19Form ADV data are only available since 2009. I follow Del Guercio, Genc and Tran (2017) and use
2009 data to backfill observations before 2009.
67
samples and find that the average CrossSale and CrossBuy are significantly larger in
the high ACT subsample than those in the low ACT subsample. I do not find significant
difference across two subsamples for the matched cross-trading variables. Table 13 Panel
C shows the univariate comparison of open-end funds characteristics. Fund families that
allow more opportunities in cross-trading are smaller in family size and open-end funds in
these families have higher flow volatility.
Table 14 shows the piece-wise regression results for two subsamples. In the high
ACT subsample, cross-trading is significantly correlated with open-end fund flows. The
coefficient on the interaction between Affiliated and LargeOutflow is significantly neg-
ative when I use CrossSale as dependent variable and insignificant when I use CrossBuy
as dependent variable. I find modest evidence that open-end fund with large inflows cross-
buy from affiliated closed-end funds: CrossBuy is positively associated with LargeInflow
but the significance goes away when I look at the net cross-trading. The piece-wise re-
gression results in the high ACT subsample provide evidence that distressed open-end
funds cross-sell to affiliated closed-end funds when the fund’s investment advisor are al-
lowed to coordinate cross-trading. In the low ACT subsample, I find no evidence that
cross-trading is correlated with open-end fund flows. The coefficients on flow variables
are mostly insignificant, suggesting that open-end funds do not use cross-trading as a liq-
uidity management tool when the investment advisors are not allowed to engage in cross-
trading. In conclusion, the subsample tests in Table 14 are consistent with my hypothesis
that fund families use cross-trading as an alternative liquidity management channel when
open-end funds are in distress.
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6.2.3 2SLS - Cross-trading and Open-end Fund Performance
In Section 5, I use OLS regressions to test how cross-trading affects open-end fund perfor-
mance. Table 8 shows that CrossSale and NetCrossSale are negatively associated with
open-end fund performance. Such a negative association is possibly caused by the endo-
geneity issue: both cross-trading and fund performance are driven by contemporaneous
fund flows. I use ACT as instrumental variable and run 2SLS regressions to overcome the
endogeneity problem. The cross-trading policy of an investment advisor is determined at
the fund’s inception and tends to be highly stable over time. Most investment advisors do
not change the cross-trading rules throughout the fund’s life. Those who make changes
usually stick with the new cross-trading policies for at least a few years.
Table 15 shows the second-stage regression results. After using the IV regression, I
find no correlation between cross-trading and open-end fund performance, suggesting that
cross-trading do not affect fund performance. There are two possible explanations. First,
fund families strictly follow the SEC’s ”fair price” rule on cross-trading, therefore, cross-
trading do not affect open-end fund performance. Second, fund families give preferen-
tial treatment to open-end funds in internal market cross-trading. However, the economic
magnitude of preferential treatment in cross-trading is not enough to offset the negative
impact of forced liquidation. The fund performance test in Table Table 15 is unable to
tell whether open-end funds get favorable prices when they cross-trade with affiliated
closed-end funds. If they do, I expect that the preferential treatment is most significant
in funds with weak governance. Further tests that control for open-end funds’ governance
may deepen our understanding on how fund families use cross-trading in liquidity man-
agement.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I start with examining the flow-performance relationship in municipal bond
funds. I find that investor flows are highly sensitive to past good and poor performance.
The high flow-performance sensitivity and low liquidity in the municipal bond market
give fund managers incentive to manage liquidity risk. I study the cash position and port-
folio liquidity of municipal bond funds and find evidence of active liquidity management.
Municipal bond funds build liquidity buffers when they have high liquidity risk. They
use cash and liquid securities to accommodate investor flows. Open-end municipal bond
funds, on average, hold limited cash in their portfolios because of the low flow-volatility.
However, the low cash holdings also means that cash buffers are not enough to meet large
investor redemptions. Therefore, municipal bond funds turn to alternative liquidity man-
agement tools in extreme situations. I find evidence of family-level liquidity management
through cross-trading. Fund families coordinate cross-trading between open- and closed-
end funds when open-end funds experience large outflows. The coordinated cross-trading
tends to be one-way: distressed open-end funds cross-sell to affiliated closed-end funds.
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APPENDIX A
MUNICIPAL BOND PRICE
I search MSRB and Morningstar database for information on month-end prices of munici-
pal bonds. MSRB municipal bond trading database reports the trading price and time for
each transaction. Morningstar mutual fund holding database gives the quarter-end price
of each municipal bond held by an investment funds. I follow these steps to determine a
municipal bond’s month-end price:
(1) I search MSRB database for municipal bonds that are traded at least once on
the last day of a month. I use the last dealer-purchase transaction price as the bond’s
month-end bid price and the last dealer-sell price as the bond’s month-end ask price. If
a bond has both month-end bid and ask price estimates, I compute its month-end price
by averaging the two estimates. If only bid or ask price is available, I use it as the month-
end price.
(2) I search MSRB database for municipal bonds that are traded at any time within
a month. I use the prices of the last dealer-purchase and dealer-sell transactions and ad-
just them by maturity-matched Barclay municipal index returns to estimate the month-
end bid and ask prices. The month-end price is the simple average. If only one price is
available, I use it as the month-end price.
(3) I search Morningstar holding dataset for municipal bonds that are held by at
least one municipal bond fund at the end of a month. The bond’s month-end price is the
median of all prices reported by municipal bond funds that hold the bond at the end of
the month.
I follow Cici and Gibson (2012) and require each municipal bond to have at least
one year to maturity to be included in the sample.
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APPENDIX B
CASH HOLDINGS IN THE PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Table B1: Cash Holdings from Mutual Fund Liquidity White Paper
This table shows the sample mean statistics from Hanouna, Novak, Riley and Stahel
(2015) Liquidity and Flows of U.S. Mutual Funds. The cash holding data is from Table
5 Panel A in their paper. The flow volatility (1999-2014) data is from Table 6 Panel A.
Percentiles of monthly flow (1999-2014) are from Table 8 Panel A.
Cash (End of 2014) Flow Volatility Monthly Flow
Mean SD Mean SD P5 P95
All 4.1% 12.8% 5.9% 5.7% -4.8% 8.4%
Alternative Strategy 22.9% 32.2% 13.6% 10.2% -18.7% 28.6%
Foreign Bonds 5.1% 19.0% 8.2% 5.9% -6.5% 11.3%
Foreign Equity 2.6% 6.5% 6.3% 5.2% -5.2% 9.5%
General Bonds 2.9% 13.4% 6.6% 6.2% -5.9% 9.2%
Mixed Strategy 5.9% 15.0% 5.3% 5.1% -3.9% 8.4%
Mortgage-Backed Securi-
ties
-1.6% 15.1% 6.3% 4.7% -5.3% 10.8%
US Corporate Bonds 2.5% 12.0% 4.9% 4.1% -4.5% 6.2%
US Equity 3.1% 7.7% 5.8% 5.5% -4.8% 8.4%
US Government Bonds 2.8% 14.0% 6.5% 5.9% -5.8% 8.5%
US Municipal Bonds 1.9% 4.2% 2.7% 2.6% -3.1% 3.6%
US open-end municipal bond funds from 2002 to June 2016
Cash F lowV ol12 Monthly Flow
Mean SD Mean SD P5 P95
US Municipal Bonds 1.52% 2.26% 1.47% 1.10% -3.09% 3.57%
CashCRSP FlowV ol24 Quarterly Flow
Mean SD Mean SD P5 P95
US Municipal Bonds 2.22% 3.51% 1.63% 1.07% -7.77% 10.75%
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